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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
: Case No. 20040324-CA 
JOSEPH DELEE ANTENCIO, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of one count of Burglary a 
third-degree felony in violation of U.C.A. §76-6-202 (1953). The trial 
court, sitting with a jury, found the Defendant guilty on February 19, 
2004. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(c). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN 
VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, SECTIONS 
SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION BY HIS ATTORNEY'S FAILURE 
TO MOVE THE TRIAL COURT FOR A DIRECTED 
VERDICT AND FAILURE TO MOVE FOR A 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must 
determine as a matter of fact and law whether the Defendant was denied 
his right to effective assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the United States 
Supreme Court articulated a two part test, which was adopted in State v. 
Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine whether counsel was 
ineffective. The Court held that; 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by 
the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show 
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 
This requires showing that counsel's errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial 
whose result is reliable. Id. at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 
2d at 69|3. 
POINT II 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN 
ERROR IN FAILING TO ENTER A DIRECTED 
VERDICT OF AQUITTAL AT THE CLOSE OF 
THE CASE FOR THE REASONS THAT THERE 
WAS INSUFFICENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A 
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CONVICTION AND THE BURGLARY CHARGE 
SHOULD FAIL ON GROUNDS OF 
INCONSISTANT VERDICT? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was not properly 
preserved for appeal therefore the plain error standard applies. "To 
establish plain error, a defendant must show: (1) an error did in fact 
occur, (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) 
the error is harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
(See also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah CtApp. 1992) and 
State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993)). In cases where the 
claim is insufficient evidence, this Court has held " as a general rule, 
claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal." 
State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346, 350 (Utah 2000). However, the Court 
went further to state, " It necessarily follows that the trial court plainly 
errs if it submits the case to the jury and thus fails to discharge a 
defendant when the insufficiency of the evidence is apparent to the 
court." (Id. at 351) 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
SIXTH AMENDMENT 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States 
and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
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UTAH CONSITITUION 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 12. [RIGHTS OF ACCUSED PERSONS.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of 
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have 
compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county 
or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
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Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to determining 
whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. 
Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay 
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any 
preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial 
proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate 
discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule, (emphasis added) 
UTAH CODE 
U.C.A.§76-6-202. Burglary. 
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully 
in a building or any portion of a building with intent to commit: 
(a) a felony; 
(b) theft; 
(c) an assault on any person; 
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1); 
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3); 
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5; or 
6 
(g) voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-702.7(2) or (5). 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed 
in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any of the 
offenses listed in Subsections (l)(a) through (g), and which may be 
committed by the actor while he is in the building. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 17 
(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the 
conclusion of all the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing 
any information or indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground 
that the evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the offense 
charged therein or any lesser included offense. 
Rule 19 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or 
omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is 
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the 
ground of his objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, 
error may be assigned to instructions in order to avoid manifest 
injustice. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by Information with a two-count 
information charging Burglary a third-degree felony in violation of 
U.C.A. §76-6-202 (1953) as amended, and Theft, a class B 
misdemeanor in violation of U.C.A. §76-6-404 (1953) as amended (R. 
1). The Defendant was found guilty of the burglary charge, and not 
guilty of the theft charge by a jury with the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield 
presiding on February 19, 2004. The Court sentenced the defendant to 
an indeterminate sentence of 0-5 years at the Utah State Prison, and 
suspended that commitment and placed the defendant on probation on 
March 30, 2004. (R. 209) The judgment and order on sentencing was 
entered on April 6, 2004 (R. 213). On April 21, 2004, the Defendant 
filed a notice of appeal. (R. 217). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the evening of July 11, 2002 the office of International Mill 
Service in Plymouth Utah was closed for business. Sometime during 
the night an intruder broke a window and entered the premises. (R.253 
pg. 52) The sole item taken during this burglary was a cash box that 
contained approximately $130.00. (R.253 pg. 53) This cash box was 
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located in the locked desk drawer of employee Susan Miller. (R.253 
pg. 52) The top drawer of Ms. Miller's desk was forcibly entered, 
which then allowed the intruder access to all the desk drawers. The cash 
box was located in the bottom left drawer. (R.253 pg. 53) The thief 
apparently did not look any further, and missed a petty cash box that 
contained $100, which was located in the bottom right drawer of the 
same desk. (R.253 pg. 53) Everyone who worked for IMS would have 
known of the location of the cash box. The defendant had previously 
worked as an employee of IMS, for a period of just over a year. He had 
been fired from the company in August 2001. Ms. Miller testified that 
he may have had a grudge against the company. (R.253 pg. 54) Ms. 
Miller also testified that she regularly wiped down the surface of her 
desk with 409 cleaner and a rag, and had done so after August 2001 and 
prior to July 2002. (R.253 pg. 56) 
Deputy Larry Johnson, an employee of the Box Elder County 
Sheriffs office investigated the scene of the crime. He discovered a 
footprint inside the building, on the top of a computer tower, 
immediately below the broken window. This window was the 
presumed point of entry into the building. (R.253 pg. 63) Deputy 
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Johnson also located a fingerprint on the desk of Ms. Miller, and 
photographed and lifted the print. (R.253 pg. 65) 
Deputy Johnson also executed a search warrant of the 
defendant's house and located a pair of Herman Survivor work boots, 
which were seized for evidence. (R.253 pg. 70) The boots seized at the 
defendant's house had soles that would be consistent with the print left 
on the computer tower. That print would have been consistent with the 
boots of all employees at IMS. (R.253 pg. 72) There were no unique 
marks on the boot print that would distinguish that print from any 
number of work boots. (R.253 pg. 75) 
Paul Rimmasch, a crime scene investigator for the Weber Metro 
Crime Scene Investigative Unit testified that he examined the latent 
print left at the crime scene and compared it to the defendant's finger 
print and determined that they were the same. (R.253 pg. 84) 
Investigator Rimmasch testified that although it is possible that a 
fingerprint could survive on a desk for 11 months, it was highly 
unlikely. He fiirther testified that if it were directly wiped with a 
cleaner such as Formula 409 it would not survive. (R.253 pg. 89) 
The defendant testified that during his time of employment at 
IMS he often went into the office as a part of his employment. He 
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would often visit the desk of Ms. Miller as many as 20 times in a day. 
He testified that he would open the drawer to her desk (on which the 
fingerprint was found) to retrieve paper forms and office supplies. 
(R.253 pg. 106) 
The defendant gave no statements to the police. The defendant 
was charged with the crimes of Burglary, a third degree felony and a 
class A misdemeanor theft. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The defendant was convicted of the charge of Burglary. The 
State filed an information charging the defendant with burglary and 
theft. The State had the burden of proving each element of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and failed in its burden on the theft charge. 
Once the jury returned with a finding of not guilty on the theft charge, 
the burglary charge by operation of law should have also failed. 
Defense counsel was ineffective in failing to notice this inconsistency 
and the trial court compounded that failure by committing plain error in 
not rectifying the situation by entering a judgment of acquittal on the 
case. This appears to be a case of first impression in the State of Utah. 
The language of the burglary statute is clear and unambiguous in setting 
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forth the elements of the offense to include an intent to commit the 
secondary crime. In the case at hand, the only evidence presented to 
the jury on the secondary crime was an allegation of theft. There was 
absolutely no evidence that the intruder attempted to commit a theft but 
was unsuccessful, since the only testimony regarding anything 
disturbed in the premises was the desk drawer wherein the cash box 
was located. For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this 
court to reverse his conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN 
VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, SECTIONS 
SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION WHEN HIS ATTORNEY FAILED 
TO MOVE THE TRIAL COURT FOR A DIRECTED 
VERDICT AND FAILED TO MOVE FOR A 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right 
to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692 (1984). In 
Strickland, the Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine 
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whether counsel's assistance was ineffective. "First, the defendant 
must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires 
showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed.2d at 
693. 
In making that assessment, the Court in Strickland v. Washington 
gave some guidance in noting; "The proper measure of attorney 
performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing 
professional norms." (Id. at 688) Although the Court in Strickland did 
not "exhaustively define the obligations of counsel nor form a checklist 
for judicial evaluation of attorney performance", (Id. at 688) it did 
mention certain minimal requirements. These duties include, "the 
overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause" as well as "a duty 
to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a 
reliable adversarial testing process." (Id. at 688) Additionally, the 
overarching requirement by the Supreme Court in ineffective assistance 
of counsel cases includes a "performance inquiry [as to] whether 
counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances." 
(Id. at 688) 
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Several other cases more specifically define when a defense 
counsels performance has slipped below the threshold cited above. 
In the case of Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365 (1986) the 
Court was presented with a case where defense counsel, due to a failure 
to conduct proper discovery, did not timely file a motion to suppress 
evidence under the 4th Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed his 
conviction under an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The 
Supreme Coun affirmed that reversal. In that affirmation the Court 
stated: 
Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment 
claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, 
the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim 
is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the 
verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence 
in order to demonstrate actual prejudice. {Kimmelman v. 
Morrrison, All U.S. 365, 375 (1986)) 
In making the determination that trial counsels conduct failed to 
comport with constitutional requirements the Court held: 
In this case, however, we deal with a total failure to conduct 
pretrial discovery, and one as to which counsel offered only 
implausible explanations. Counsel's performance at trial, while 
generally creditable enough, suggests no better explanation for 
this apparent and pervasive failure to "make reasonable 
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes 
particular investigations unnecessary." [citation omitted] Under 
these circumstances, although the failure of the District Court and 
the Court of Appeals to examine counsel's overall performance 
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was inadvisable, we think this omission did not affect the 
soundness of the conclusion both courts reached — that counsel's 
performance fell below the level of reasonable professional 
assistance in the respects alleged. (Kimmelman v. Morrrison, Ml 
U.S. 365, 386 (1986)) 
In the case of Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 
156 L.Ed.2d 471, (U.S. 2003) the U.S. Supreme Court found that 
counsel's failure to investigate the extensive abuse the defendant had 
suffered through his life was unreasonable. The Court reversed his 
conviction on the grounds that this failure resulted in defense counsels 
inability to present this evidence to the sentencing jury in a capital case. 
The Court stated: 
We further find that had the jury been confronted with this 
considerable mitigating evidence, there is a reasonable 
probability that it would have returned with a different sentence. 
{Wiggins v. Smith at Point III) 
The Utah Appellate Courts have adopted the Strickland test and 
have likewise rendered decisions in ineffective assistance of counsel 
cases that can guide a determination of when a defense attorney fails in 
his appointed duties. 
In the case of State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998) the Court held that the failure of trial counsel to object to a 4th 
Amendment violation constituted reversible ineffective assistance of 
counsel error. In that case, the Court applied the Strickland test to a 
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situation where defense counsel had in a pretrial motion moved to 
suppress evidence on the basis of an illegal search. The trial court 
denied that motion based upon evidence at a preliminary hearing. 
During trial, the officer altered his testimony establishing the lack of 
plain view, yet trial counsel did not re-raise the motion to suppress. The 
Court held that "where a defendant can show that there was no 
conceivable legitimate tactical basis for counsel's deficient actions, the 
first prong of Strickland is satisfied." (Id. at 976, quoting State v. 
Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
In the case of State v. Smith, 65 P. 3d 648, 656 (Utah Ct. App. 
2003) the Utah Court of Appeals was presented with a case very similar 
to the case at bar. The court reversed a defendant's conviction under an 
ineffective assistance of counsel theory where counsel "fail[ed] to move 
for a directed verdict after the State failed to present evidence that 
Smith did not possess a valid concealed weapon permit during its case 
in chief." 
In the present case defense counsel failed to move for a directed 
verdict after the State failed to establish a prima facie case that the 
defendant committed the alleged acts beyond a reasonable doubt. This 
failure, and this failure alone constitutes ineffective assistance of 
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counsel given the fact that defense counsel did surprisingly little by 
way of defense. Defense counsel's entire case after the State rested 
consisted of the recalling two of the State's witnesses to ask questions 
regarding the durability of a fingerprint, an issue on which they had 
been previously questioned. The defendant then took the stand and 
testified that he had been in the office numerous times, which testimony 
was consistent with Ms. Miller's prior testimony. 
The deficiency of defense counsel is most glaringly demonstrated 
at the time that the jury returned with its verdict of guilty on the 
burglary charge and not guilty on the theft charge. Defense counsel did 
not even recognize the inconsistency of those two verdicts and failed to 
raise the same to the trial court. This failure was in light of the request 
by the trial court for "any matter either side want[s] to place in the 
record?" This inconsistent verdict will be more fully discussed in Point 
II below. 
The second prong of the two-part test articulated in Strickland is 
"the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as 
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
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In Strickland, the Court held that "[t]he purpose of the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the 
assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the 
proceeding;' In State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that to meet the second part of the Strickland test a 
defendant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 187(quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). In making the determination 
that counsel was ineffective the appellate court should "consider the 
totality of the evidence, taking into account such factors as whether the 
errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and 
how strongly the verdict is supported by the record." Id. 
In the case at bar, the second prong of the Strickland test has 
clearly been met. If defense counsel had made a motion to dismiss 
notwithstanding the verdict, based on grounds of inconsistent verdict 
and impossibility, the court, in all likelihood would have granted the 
dismissal. Furthermore, if defense counsel had made a motion to 
dismiss at the end of the State's case, the trial court would have had the 
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opportunity to review the case for sufficiency of evidence, which issue 
the trial court did not address. As it stands, the defendant is now 
relegated to a position of arguing to this Appellate Court with a higher 
standard of review of plain error. 
POINT II 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN 
ERROR IN FAILING TO ENTER A DIRECTED 
VERDICT OF AQUITTAL AT THE CLOSE OF 
THE PROSECUTION'S CASE FOR THE 
REASONS THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICENT 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION AND 
THE BURGLARY CHARGE SHOULD FAIL ON 
GROUNDS OF INCONSISTANT VERDICT? 
The defendant was convicted at a jury trial of the offense of 
Burglary, and Not Guilty of the additional offense of theft. The 
defendant recognizes the substantial burden faced when asking an 
Appellate Court to reverse on the grounds of insufficiency of evidence 
to support the conviction. In the case of State v. Tucker, 96 P.3d 367, 
371 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) this Court held: 
To reverse a jury verdict, we must find that "the 
evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking 
or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict 
plainly unreasonable and unjust." "Therefore, [as] long 
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as there is some evidence and reasonable inferences to 
support the jury's verdict, we will not disturb a jury's 
findings." (citing State v. Bradley, 576 P.3d 1142 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2002) and State v. Heaps, 999P.2d 565 (Utah 
2000) 
See also, State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985). 
[W]e review the evidence and all inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to 
the verdict of the jury. We reverse a jury conviction for 
insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, 
is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
An appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of 
the jury. State v. Kalisz, 735 P.2d 60, 61 (Utah 1987). As long as there 
is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, "from which 
findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be 
made, our inquiry stops." State v. Booker, 709 P.2d at 345. 
The defendant is likewise cognizant of the requirement to 
properly preserve the issue for appeal. In a jury trial, it is normally 
required that the defendant make a motion to dismiss at the end of the 
State's case. In the case of State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346, 350 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2000), the Court reaffirmed the requirement that "claims not 
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raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal." In that case 
the court held: 
The preservation rule serves two important policies. First, 
"in the interest of orderly procedure, the trial court ought 
to be given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, 
if appropriate, correct it." (citing State v. Eldredge, 113 
P.2d 29, 36 (Utah 1989). 
The Defendant recognizes the difficult burden he must overcome 
in challenging a trial court's failure to dismiss for lack of evidence. In 
the case of State v. Silva 13 P.3d 604 (Utah App. Ct. 2000) the court 
stated, "[TJhis court's power to review a jury verdict challenged on 
grounds of insufficient evidence is limited." (Citations omitted) The 
Utah Supreme Court has said, "So long as there is some evidence, 
including reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite 
elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." State 
v. Mead 27 P.3d 1115, 1132 (Utah 2001) (citations omitted) 
Additionally, in State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) the 
Court stated, "Ordinarily, a reviewing court may not reassess credibility 
or reweigh the evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the evidence in 
favor of the jury verdict." 
The Utah Appellate Courts have, however, ruled that absent 
sufficient evidence establishing each element of the offense charged, an 
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Appellate Court may overturn a conviction. In State v. Workman, infra 
at 985, the Court reversed a conviction of sexual exploitation of a 
minor holding: "A guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely 
on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of 
guilt." In that case, the prosecution presented no evidence, expert or 
otherwise, that the photograph in question could have been taken for 
purposes of sexual arousal. Given that lack of evidence the Court 
vacated the defendant's guilty verdict. 
Similarly, in the case of State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 
1983) the Court reversed the conviction of a defendant in a second 
degree murder case where the evidence as to intent was deficient. In 
that case there was undisputed evidence that the victim had been 
murdered. The sole evidence against the defendant consisted of the fact 
that the defendant was the last person seen with the victim, and the fact 
that he had related a dream to three individuals in which he recalled 
slapping the girl and that he "thought he hurt her. He thought he might 
have killed her.7' (Id at 446) In that case the Court stated: 
The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover 
the gap between the presumption of innocence and the 
proof of guilt. In fulfillment of its duty to review the 
evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be 
drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict, the 
reviewing court will stretch the evidentiary fabric as far as 
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it will go. But this does not mean that the court can take a 
speculative leap across a remaining gap in order to sustain 
a verdict. The evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, must 
be sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. (State v. Petree @ 444) 
Furthermore, in the recent case of State v. Shumway, 63 P.3d 94 
(Utah 2002) the Court, again recognizing the significant standard of 
review required to reverse a conviction in an insufficient evidence 
appeal, reversed the trial court's conviction of evidence tampering. In 
that case, there was some expert testimony that opined that a second, 
smaller knife had also been used in a murder of an individual. No other 
evidence as to a second weapon (the first weapon was recovered) was 
found, but rather, the prosecution relied on an inference that the 
defendant had the motive and opportunity to dispose of a second 
weapon. In reversing that conviction, the Court held: 
After giving full weight to all of the evidence supporting 
[the defendants] conviction of evidence tampering, we 
conclude that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his 
conviction. At most, the evidence supports only the 
proposition that [the defendant] had the opportunity to 
destroy or conceal the second implement, if indeed it ever 
existed. 
The case before this Court today brings a somewhat unique 
question regarding an inconsistent jury verdict. The defendant was 
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charged with burglary and theft, and the only evidence produced at trial 
regarding the second element of burglary is that the Defendant 
committed a theft of some $130. The jury returned a verdict of guilt on 
the burglary charge and a not guilty verdict on the theft charge. The 
inconsistency of these verdicts is glaringly obvious. Under Utah law a 
burglary requires both an unauthorized entering together with an intent 
to commit theft or other crime. 
While Defendant has found one Utah case in which the 
defendant was found guilty of theft, but found not guilty of burglary1 
{State v. Swain, 835 P.2d 1009 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)), Defendant has 
not found a Utah case where the defendant was found guilty of a 
burglary but acquitted of the underlying theft charge. The Utah 
burglary statute provides in relevant part: 
§76-6-202. Burglary. 
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains 
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent 
to commit:(b)theft;2 
1
 Which verdict could readily be found by a jury to be consistent where 
a defendant is determined to have stolen an item, but the element of 
entering or remaining unlawfully was not proven. 
2
 The statute provides the other possible second elements i.e. felony, 
assault, lewdness, etc., however, the State made no allegation nor 
provided any testimony of any second element other than the charged 
theft. 
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Therefore, a requisite element of the offense is the intent to 
commit a theft after entering or remaining in a building. While defense 
counsel recognizes the difference between intent and action, in the case 
at bar, no reasonable jury could find the one without the other, given 
the facts of the case. 
In the case of State v. Hancock 874 P.2d 132, 134 (Utah App. 
Ct. 1994) this Court held; 
When considering an inconsistency challenge to jury 
verdicts, we "review the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the verdict" and will "not overturn a jury's 
verdict of criminal conviction unless reasonable minds 
could not rationally have arrived at a verdict of guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt based on the law and on the 
evidence presented." (Citing State v. Bergwerff, 111 P.2d 
510, 511, (Utah App. Ct. 1989) 
When multiple crimes are charged and when those crimes 
each require proof of different elements, there is no 
inconsistency between guilty verdicts on some and not 
guilty verdicts on others. {State v. Hancock @ 134) 
In the case of State v. Bergwerff, 111 P.2d 510, (Utah App. Ct. 
1989) the court held: 
It is the jury's prerogative to weigh the evidence, infer the 
material facts from it, and apply the law stated in the jury 
instructions to the facts. In order to preserve this 
prerogative, we review the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, and do not overturn a jury's 
verdict of criminal conviction unless reasonable minds 
could not rationally have arrived at a verdict of guilty 
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beyond a reasonable doubt based on the law and on the 
evidence presented. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of State v. Stewart, 729 P.2d 
610, 613 (Utah 1968) has held that inconsistent verdicts (i.e. where one 
defendant is acquitted and one found guilty) are not grounds for a 
reversal of a conviction. That instance, however, is much different 
from the case at bar. 
The case at bar presents this Court with a unique issue as to 
whether once the jury returns a finding of not guilty on an underlying 
theft charge, does the burglary charge, by operation of law, fail as well. 
It is clear that the Utah statute requires the concert of both an unlawful 
entry as well as intent to commit a theft. If a jury finds that the state has 
failed in it's burden of proof on the theft case, that same jury cannot 
somehow find that the state has met it's burden on the burglary, since 
the theft is an essential element of that charge. 
Other jurisdictions have explored this issue, and although some 
have affirmed a conviction where a jury returned a verdict of guilt on a 
burglary and not guilty on the underlying theft charge, in each of those 
cases the evidence readily pointed to an intent to commit theft. Some 
of those cases are as follows: 
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In McCovens v. State, 539 N.E.2d 26, (Indiana 1989) The 
Court held that the finding of guilt on burglary and an acquittal on the 
underlying theft charges were not inconsistent since the evidence 
showed the unlawful entry, and an attempted theft, but no theft had 
occurred. In State v. Hall, 764 P.2d 926, (Oregon Ct. App. 1988), the 
Court held that since the defendant was interrupted as he was entering 
the premises, the acquittal on the theft was not inconsistent with the 
burglary conviction since the intent to commit theft could be reasonably 
inferred by the jury. See also May v. State, 810 N.E.2d 741 (Indiana Ct. 
App. 2004) where the Court upheld another burglary interrupted in 
progress where the jury returned a not guilty verdict on the underlying 
theft charge. 
In the case of People v. Gibson, 449 N.E.2d 182 (111. Ct. App. 
1983) the Court upheld a burglary conviction in light of the fact that the 
jury acquitted on the theft charge. In that case, however, the not guilty 
finding on the theft was a failure to prove the value over $150. In State 
v. Radi, 578 P.2d 1169, 1176 (Mont. 1978), reaffirmed in State v. Radi, 
604 P.2d 318, 323 (Mont. 1979) the court allowed a guilty verdict on a 
burglary charge to stand in light of a not guilty verdict on a theft 
charge, where the "jury was instructed to find the defendant not guilty 
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of the theft if they found him guilty of burglary." In People v. Wilfong, 
390 N.E.2d 934 (111. Ct. App. 1979) the Court affirmed the conviction 
of a burglary with a corresponding not guilty verdict on a grand theft 
auto, where the court noted that there was evidence that the defendant 
had "rifl[ed] through [the victim's] dresser drawer (which was noted in 
the trial), indicating] that defendant was looking for something." 
Additionally, the defendant did steal the keys to the automobile. 
CONCLUSION 
The State charged the defendant with burglary and theft. The 
State had the burden of proving each element of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and failed in its burden. Once the jury returned with 
a finding of not guilty on the theft charge, the burglary charge by 
operation of law should have also failed. Defense counsel was 
ineffective in failing to notice this inconsistency and the trial court 
compounded that failure by committing plain error in not rectifying the 
situation by entering a judgment of acquittal on the case. For these 
reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this court to reverse his 
conviction. 
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DATED this J_ day of March 2005. 
RANDALL W. RICHARDS; 
Attorney for Appellant 
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iNDALL W. RTCHARD 
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ADDENDUM A 
JON J. BUNDERSON 
BOX ELDER COUNTY ATTORNEY 
45 NORTH 100 EAST 
BRIGHAM CITY, UTAH 84302 
TELEPHONE: (435) 734-9464 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT-
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH DELEE ATENCIO, 
15350 NORTH 5325 WEST 
RIVERSIDE, UT 84334 
DOB: 12/19/64 
Defendant(s) 
INFORMATION 
Criminal No. / , ir • ' rA 
Investigating Officer: 
LARRY JOHNSTON 
The undersigned, as prosecuting attorney, hereby charges the 
defendant(s) with committing, at Box Elder County, State of Utah, 
the crime(s) of: 
COUNT I 
BURGLARY, A FELONY OF THE 3RD DEGREE, AT Box Elder County, Utah, 
ON OR ABOUT July 11th or 12th, 2002, IN VIOLATION OF Section 76-
6-202, UCA (1953, as amended), TO WIT, THAT ON THE DATE AFORESAID 
THE DEFENDANT(S) DID ENTER OR REMAIN UNLAWFULLY IN A BUILDING, TO 
WIT, THE OFFICE OF IMS STEEL, WITH THE INTENT TO COMMIT A FELONY 
OR THEFT. 
COUNT II 
THEFT, A CLASS »B" MISDEMEANOR, AT Box Elder County, Utah, ON OR 
ABOUT July 11th or 12th, 2002, IN VIOLATION OF Section 76-6-404, 
UCA (1953, as amended), TO WIT, THAT ON THE DATE AFORESAID THE 
DEFENDANT DID OBTAIN OR EXERCISE UNAUTHORIZED CONTROL OVER THE 
PROPERTY OF ANOTHER, TO WIT, IMS STEEL, WITH A PURPOSE TO 
DEPRIVE HIM THEREOF, SAID PROPERTY HAVING A VALUE OF $300.00 OR 
LESS. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the 
following witnesses: 
LARRY JOHNSTON, KEVIN POTTER, LARRY BLANCHARD, JOSHUA RASMUSSEN, 
SUSAN MILLER, TODD MARSHALL, PAUL RIMMASCH, RUSSELL DEAN. 
DATED this £} & day of *%/ufJf 2002 
IDERSON 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
ADDENDUM B 
BURGLARY, Instruction No. 
Defendant Joseph Atencio has been charged with burglary. To prove that 
Defendant committed burglary, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Defendant entered or remained unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building 
with intent to commit a felony or theft. 
ADDEMDUM C 
Amy F. Hugie, 8207 
Box Elder County Attorney 
01 South Main 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Telephone: (435) 734-3329 
Fax: (435) 734-3374 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH DELEE ATENCIO , 
Defendant. 
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER ON 
SENTENCING 
Court Case #: 021100094 
Judge: Ben H. Hadfield 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED matter came on regularly for sentencing on March 30, 
2004, before the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield. The Defendant appeared personally 
together with his counsel of record, Justin Bond. The State was represented by a 
member of the Box Elder County Attorney's Office. 
No legal or other reason having been shown why judgment should not be 
pronounced, it is the judgment of the Court that the Defendant is hereby convicted of 
the following crime(s): 
1: BURGLARY, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202, 
a third degree felony. 
based upon his/her guilty plea. 
Based upon said Judgment of Conviction, it is the Judgment and Order of the 
Court that the Defendant is hereby sentenced to be incarcerated in the Utah State 
Prison for a term of 0 to 5 years. Execution of the prison sentence is suspended and 
the Defendant is placed on probation for a period of 36 months on the following terms 
and conditions: 
1. Defendant shall remain incarcerated in the Box Elder County Jail for 90 days with 
credit for time served. Work release may be permitted with verifiable 
employment. 
2. Defendant shall enter into an agreement with the Utah State Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole [hereinafter "AP&P"] and comply strictly with the terms and 
conditions of said agreement, including consenting to any search and seizure of 
his/her person, property, or bodily fluids by any law enforcement personnel to 
determine Defendant's compliance with the terms of probation. 
3. Defendant shall report to AP&P and to the Court whenever required. 
4. Defendant shall violate no law, state, federal, or municipal except minor traffic 
violations. 
5. Defendant shall pay a fine of $925 with an additional $25 court security fee. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. Credit may be given for any out of 
pocket counseling expenses. 
6. Defendant shall pay a $300 PDA recoupment fee. 
7. Defendant shall pay restitution of $410.94 or amount as indicated in a restitution 
hearing. Interest may increase the final amount due. 
8. Defendant shall obtain any evaluation for drug, alcohol, or other substance abuse 
therapy as may be required by AP&P, or the Court, and Defendant shall enter 
into, and successfully complete, and pay for any counseling, therapy, or other 
program ordered by AP&P, through a provider approved by AP&P, and shall 
successfully complete all required after care. 
9. Defendant shall not use or possess any alcohol or controlled substances or 
frequent any place where alcohol or controlled substances are being used, nor 
associate with any person who uses or is consuming alcohol or any controlled 
substance. 
10. Defendant shall submit to random search and seizure of his breath or bodily 
fluids including random urinalysis as requested by a probation agent. 
11. Defendant shall obtain a probation identification card in a form prescribed by 
AP&P and shall carry it at all times and shall display the same to any law 
enforcement officer with whom Defendant comes into contact in the officer's 
official capacity. 
12. Defendant shall abide by all the terms and conditions of electronic monitoring 
required by AP&P. 
13. Defendant shall maintain all curfews required by AP&P. 
14. That the Defendant shall submit to and pay for DNA testing as required by 
statute. 
15. Defendant shall maintain full time school or employment. Defendant shall 
perform 20 hours of community service when not in verifiable employment. 
16. Defendant shall participate in the TEAM program and abide by its requirements. 
17. Defendant shall submit a letter of apology to his victim. 
The Court retains jurisdiction for further action in this matter. 
DATED this £ day of Apr,'I . 2004. 
•73-//. t\. 
Ben H. Hadfield, Judg^ 
First Judicial District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of April, 2004,1 mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document, postage pre-paid to: 
Justin Bond, Esq. 
29 South Main 
Bfigham City, UT 84302 
Legaf Secretary 
ADDENDUM D 
Page 123 
1 THE COURT: We're in chambers. The jury is out 
21 deliberating. I've been handed a note from the jury that 
3 says, "Is the defendant right or left handed?" It seems to 
4 the court that what I have to tell them is the evidence is 
5 all in. They have to make their decision based on the 
6 evidence they heard and any observations they made. We can't 
7 add anything to the record at this point. Any objection to 
8 that? 
9 MR. RASMUSSEN: I think that's accurate. 
10 MR. LINARES: I don't object to it. 
Ill THE COURT: I'll write as follows: "You must make 
12 your decision based upon your observations and the evidence 
13 presented." Thank you, counsel. We'll keep you posted. 
14 (Further recess pending deliberations.) 
15 THE COURT: It appears that the jury has reached a 
16 verdict. I'll ask the bailiff to return the jury to the 
17 courtroom. 
18 (Jury returned with verdict at 4:15 p.m.) 
19 THE COURT: Mr. Webb, it would appear that you are 
20 the foreperson. Is that correct? 
21 MR. WEBB: Yes. 
22 THE COURT: Please hand the verdict to the bailiff. 
23 (Pause.) We the jury, duly empaneled and sworn, find the 
24 defendant, count one, guilty of burglary, a felony of the 
25 third degree. Count two, not guilty of theft, a class B 
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1 misdemeanor. 
21 Do counsel desire to have the jury polled? 
3 MR. RASMUSSEN: No, Your Honor. 
4 MR. LINARES: No, Your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this 
6 concludes your service. I want to thank you for your time 
7 and consideration. There's a short survey that the clerk 
8 will ask you to fill out now. As soon as that's completed 
9 I'll come back to the jury room and visit with you and see if 
10 there's any questions I can answer now that the verdict is 
111 returned. Thank you for your service. 
12 (Jury out of the courtroom.) 
13 THE COURT: Any questions, counsel? I'm going to 
14 schedule sentencing for March 30th at 9:00 a.m. I'll direct 
15 the defendant to go over to the office of Adult Probation and 
16 Parole. Go over there this afternoon. They're open until 
17 five. Just schedule an appointment. They won't be able to 
18 meet with you today, but schedule an appointment so that they 
19 can begin a presentence report. 
201 Any matters either side want to place in the record? 
21 MR. RASMUSSEN: Not from the state, Your Honor. 
22 MR. LINARES: Nothing, Your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: Thank you. Court is in recess. 
24 THE BAILIFF: Court is in recess. 
25 (Trial concluded at 4:17 p.m.) 
